A Chinese state-backed advanced persistent threat (APT) group
known for singling out Japanese entities has been attributed to a
new long-running espionage campaign targeting new geographies,
suggesting a “widening” of the threat actor’s targeting.
The widespread intrusions, which are believed to have commenced
at the earliest in mid-2021 and continued as recently as February
2022, have been tied to a group tracked as Cicada, which is
also known as APT10, Stone Panda, Potassium, Bronze Riverside, or
MenuPass Team.
“Victims in this Cicada (aka APT10) campaign include government,
legal, religious, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in
multiple countries around the world, including in Europe, Asia, and
North America,” researchers from the Symantec Threat Hunter Team,
part of Broadcom Software, said[1]
in a report shared with The Hacker News.
“There is a strong focus on victims in the government and NGO
sectors, with some of these organizations working in the areas of
religion and education,” Brigid O. Gorman, senior information
developer at the Symantec Threat Hunter Team, told The Hacker
News.
Most of the targeted organizations are located in the U.S.,
Canada, Hong Kong, Turkey, Israel, India, Montenegro, and Italy,
alongside one victim in Japan, with the adversary spending as long
as nine months on the networks of some of these victims.
“There are also some victims in the telecoms, legal and
pharmaceutical sectors, but governmental and non-profit
organizations appeared to have been the main focus in this
campaign,” Gorman added.
In March 2021, Kaspersky researchers took the wraps off an
intelligence-gathering operation[2] undertaken by the group
to deploy information-gathering implants from a number of industry
sectors located in Japan.
Then earlier this February, Stone Panda was implicated in an
organized supply chain attack[3] aimed at Taiwan’s
financial sector with the goal of stealing sensitive information
from compromised systems.
The new set of attacks observed by Symantec commences with the
actors gaining initial access by means of a known, unpatched
vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange Servers, using it to deploy
their backdoor of choice, SodaMaster[4].
“However, we did not observe the attackers exploiting a specific
vulnerability, so we cannot say if they leveraged ProxyShell or ProxyLogon[5] [flaws],” Gorman
said.
SodaMaster is a Windows-based remote access trojan that’s
equipped with features to facilitate the retrieval of additional
payloads and exfiltrate the information back to its
command-and-control (C2) server.
Other tools deployed during the infiltrations include the
Mimikatz credential dumping utility, NBTScan to conduct internal
reconnaissance, WMIExec for remote command execution, and VLC Media
Player to launch a custom loader on the infected host.
“This campaign with victims in such a large number of sectors
appears to show the group is now interested in a wider variety of
targets,” Gorman said.
“The sorts of organizations targeted — nonprofits and government
organizations, including those involved in religious and education
activity — are most likely to be of interest to the group for
espionage purposes. The sort of activity we see on victim machines
and past Cicada activity also all point to the motivation behind
this campaign being espionage.”
References
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said
(symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com) - ^
intelligence-gathering operation
(thehackernews.com) - ^
organized supply chain attack
(thehackernews.com) - ^
SodaMaster
(malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de) - ^
ProxyShell or ProxyLogon
(thehackernews.com)
Read more https://thehackernews.com/2022/04/researchers-trace-widespread-espionage.html
