The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on Monday published a new joint
advisory as part of their latest attempts to expose the tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) adopted by the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service (SVR) in its attacks targeting the U.S and
foreign entities.
By employing “stealthy intrusion tradecraft within compromised
networks,” the intelligence agencies said[1], “the SVR activity—which
includes the recent SolarWinds Orion supply chain
compromise[2]—primarily targets
government networks, think tank and policy analysis organizations,
and information technology companies and seeks to gather
intelligence information.”
The cyber actor is also being tracked under different monikers,
including Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT29), the Dukes,
CozyBear, and Yttrium. The development comes as the U.S. sanctioned
Russia and formally pinned[3]
the SolarWinds hack and related cyberespionage campaign to
government operatives working for SVR.
APT29[4], since emerging on the
threat landscape in 2013, has been tied to a number of attacks
orchestrated with the goal of gaining access to victim networks,
move within victim environments undetected, and extract sensitive
information. But in a noticeable shift in tactics in 2018, the
actor moved from deploying malware on target networks to striking
cloud-based email services, a fact borne by the SolarWinds attack,
wherein the actor leveraged Orion binaries as an intrusion vector
to exploit Microsoft Office 365 environments.
This similarity in post-infection tradecraft with other
SVR-sponsored attacks, including in the manner the adversary
laterally moved through the networks to obtain access to email
accounts, is said to have played a huge role in attributing the
SolarWinds campaign to the Russian intelligence service, despite a
notable departure in the method used to gain an initial
foothold.
“Targeting cloud resources probably reduces the likelihood of
detection by using compromised accounts or system misconfigurations
to blend in with normal or unmonitored traffic in an environment
not well defended, monitored, or understood by victim
organizations,” the agency noted.
Among some of the other tactics put to use by APT29 are password
spraying (observed during a 2018 compromise of a large unnamed
network), exploiting zero-day flaws against virtual private network
appliances (such as CVE-2019-19781[5]) to obtain network
access, and deploying a Golang malware called WELLMESS[6]
to plunder intellectual property[7]
from multiple organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine
development.
Besides CVE-2019-19781, the threat actor is known to gain
initial footholds into victim devices and networks by leveraging
CVE-2018-13379[8], CVE-2019-9670[9], CVE-2019-11510[10], and CVE-2020-4006[11].
“The FBI and DHS recommend service providers strengthen their
user validation and verification systems to prohibit misuse of
their services,” the advisory recommended, while also urging
businesses to secure their networks from a compromise of trusted
software.
References
- ^
said
(us-cert.cisa.gov) - ^
SolarWinds Orion supply chain
compromise (thehackernews.com) - ^
formally
pinned (thehackernews.com) - ^
APT29
(malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de) - ^
CVE-2019-19781
(nvd.nist.gov) - ^
WELLMESS
(blogs.jpcert.or.jp) - ^
intellectual property
(www.pwc.co.uk) - ^
CVE-2018-13379
(nvd.nist.gov) - ^
CVE-2019-9670
(nvd.nist.gov) - ^
CVE-2019-11510
(nvd.nist.gov) - ^
CVE-2020-4006
(nvd.nist.gov)
